Gendering the Welfare State:
The Issue of Carework Salaries in Germany

1 Introduction

That in modern welfare states financial transfers for the work of childcare and child-raising in the private family sphere could be paid in the form of a parental wage--or more generally, a "carework salary"--would have seemed just a few decades ago quite unthinkable. Of course in the feminist discussion of the 1970s the introduction of "wages for housework" was proposed, but this proposal never reached the general social-policy debate, and was very controversial in feminist circles, too (for an overview see Leipert/Opielka, 1999). However, in recent decades the options in the social-policy arena have changed considerably. The superficial reasons for this are above all the demographic upheavals in practically all, and especially, West-European OECD-states, who on the one hand increasingly cannot guarantee care for older persons in the "natural" way within the family, and on the other hand have increasingly allowed children to become a scarce resource, which presents problems above all for financing old-age security and medical insurance programs (cf. Daly 2002).

That the "natural" reproduction process in families is diminishing has other, sociocultural causes, above all in connection with change in the gender self-image. While women still do feel primarily responsible for family tasks, their educational and occupational background is increasingly comparable to that of men, which, in a subsequent and successful integration into the work world, clearly causes a situation of multiple obligations. Their response is to withdraw from the family carework to a societally significant extent, by avoiding living with (and in-home care of) parents (and/or in-laws), and by practicing anti-conception. From the point of view of payment for family-internal carework, the two problem-complexes mentioned here should be of course kept apart. The care of the elderly is dependent

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on other social-policy preconditions and consequences than is at-home care of children.²

In this study we are concentrating on the latter—the discussion surrounding the introduction of payment for childcare within the family. Therefore when referring in the following to family carework, we necessarily mean childcare. Further, the present paper concentrates on Germany and the discussion which is being carried on there. This discussion would seem however—in spite of the unusual historical factors, as will be seen—generally, and perhaps because of the historical specificity, even paradigmatically relevant: like through a magnifying-glass, the changes in work in the family and the attendant socio-political issues come to a focus in it, as a series of recent comparative studies of European family-policy show (see Pfau-Effinger, 1999; Carling et al., 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2002).

The question of the value-relation between work in the family and work in market-based employment is being currently raised anew.³ The old dichotomy is in a practical and theoretical crisis. That dichotomy viewed work in the family not as economically productive, but as reproductive activity, one of the many non-monetary requirements of the money economy—like peace, natural resources, or economically friendly ethics. The practical crisis is apparent above all in sinking birthrates and their dramatic demographic consequences. The theoretical crisis can be recognized therein, that the feminist criticism of traditional disregard for important carework performed mainly by women is now reaching the core of contemporary democratic and economic theory, and that the old, market-capitalistic dichotomy is being challenged by newer theories stressing the role of the social capital created in and by the family. One of the foremost experts for the comparative welfare state research, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, in his most recent book ar-

² The beginning of the necessity of care for older family-members is hardly foreseeable, and depends greatly on self-sufficiency skills and the existence of appropriate relationships.
gued for a “New Welfare State” centering on “child-centred social investments” and a “new gender contract” (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

The most important societal bridge between the family and the work world by the end of the 20th--the "social-democratic century" (Ralf Dahrendorf)--has been social policy. Social policy since its beginnings has had above all the task of organizing the process of establishing the wage-value of all work in society (Claus Offe's 
Verlohnarbeiterung, or commodification) as a political compromise between Capital, Labor and societal groups (e.g. churches) At the beginning of the 21st century, nothing essential has changed in that respect. But social policy, with its expenditure system accounting in most European societies for about one-third of the population's income, constitutes today a distinct societal sector, the Welfare State. Of course the relationship between the family and employment spheres never has been really unproblematic. But only with the politicization of social policy, and with the increasing thematicization of value relations--such as of women's rights by the Women's Movement--did family policy appear on the public agenda. And if the basis of the relation between family and employment is put into question--that historical dichotomy of the private and the societal, of reproduction and production--then that must necessarily have an effect on family policy. Thus the relationship between family and the occupational sphere is practically, theoretically and politically under discussion.

In the following we concentrate on the political aspects of this relationship--an impenetrable topic already as it is. To get a better overview, we shall proceed in two steps. The first step shall look back along the three historical way-stations of German social policy, which were unique in the world in their culminating effect: that particular family-policy pathway leading from the Motherhood cult of National Socialism, to the duality made up of the idyllic conservative family ideal of post-war West Germany on the one hand, and the socialistic work-religion of East Germany society on the other, to finally the remedial modernization of the united Germany. In the second step the German family-policy situation one decade after re-unification is examined in the context of a new orientation for the welfare state.
This leads finally to a position that requires a new historical compromise for social policy progress. In it, work in the sphere of employment, and in that of the family, are treated as qualitative equals. With that, three transaction streams are redirected out of the familial and into the state and/or societal sphere: 1-) the care of children and other care-dependent persons (by professionalization); 2-) assuring adequate coverage of living costs (by financial transfers for children and carers); 3-) regulation of the time available for family and occupational duties (by appropriate labor policies). Through this reshuffle the Welfare State itself would be changed: it adds a universalistic basis as "guarantor", to its existing three system principles (social insurance - social assistance – social care\(^4\)).

2 Germany -- a family laboratory

The compatibility of family and occupation is of course problematic not only in Germany, but there it is especially so. That is due not least to historical reasons--as the particular German path of social and family policy, beginning with the Nazi regime and its image of the woman, leading to the two separate systems of the GDR and Adenauer's West Germany, and finally to Germany as a united country seeking since 1989 its place in international developments.

2.1 The Nazi Mutterpflicht

One reads often that the housewife marriage model in Germany first became dominant with the policies of the Nazi regime. "Of course the objection to this is"--writes Birgit Pfau-Effinger in her lucid study on the cultural bases of women's employment in Europe--"that the housewife marriage model (...) already significantly earlier appeared in the center of the gender arrangement." (Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 114\(^5\)). And in fact since the second half of the 19th century all societal groups (not only) in Germany were in favor of the family model of the male breadwinner marriage. This model, initially a development of the urban bourgeois, was succes-

\(^4\) In German social policy state run transfer systems which are based neither on contributions, as social insurances, nor on need, as social assistance, are conceptualized as a third system type, called Versorgung (social care).

\(^5\) All translations from German literature in the following by the author (M.O.).
sively adapted by the workers' movement and the Social Democrats--at first in contradiction to fact, for in the working class the gainful employment of women was still necessary and usual in the 20th cen. up to the 1950s (see Hausen, 1993).

"The first, best and her proper place has the woman in the family"-- exclaimed Joseph Goebbels in his opening speech on the occasion of the exposition "The Woman" in March, 1933 (cit. after Mühlfeld/Schönweiss, 1989, p. 61). Nevertheless, the family policy path of the Nazis led actually less to the exclusion of women from the occupational sphere, for although many of their policy measures sought to promote the full-time housewife, typical was rather this paradox: women were to be reinforced in their identity of housewife and mother, but also available for work outside the home, and at the same time their traditional legal position in marriage and family was destabilized. The regime's racist objectives subjected women to marriage aptness tests and forced sterilizations, but above all reduced men to their reproductive function and promoted social and sexual irresponsibility on the part of fathers (see Czarnowski, 1991). Marriage was made a state function; the private bourgeois model was rejected. Motherhood became a national and racist-ideological duty.

The occupational participation of women was--after initial campaigns against so-called "double earners"--massively promoted with the transformation to war material production from 1936; from 1937 only employed women could be given loans for purposes of establishing a household (see Kolinsky, 1989). The success of these measures--including even obligatory registration and work from 1943 on--remained however limited. The level of women's employment from the beginning to the end of the war rose but little--from 14.5 to 14.9 million. "The essential cause lay in the fact that women whose husbands were away in the war received special financial support. Many women as a result discontinued their employment--an unintentional effect of the measure." (Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 115)

From the Nazi family policies there remains however, for our purposes, one problem: the housewife model of marriage, and more generally, the recognition of mothers' (work) contribution was seen in post-war Germany--and above all for
many critical intellectuals there after 1968--as a product of fascist motherhood-ideology. This was historically false, and theoretically--serious. For now, motherhood began to be politically suspect.

2.2 GDR: the right to and duty of employment

In the Soviet occupation zone, women's policies, under the influence of the Soviet military administration, were consciously and radically delimited from those of the Nazi regime. With reference to the Marxist traditions of the German workers' movement, a new image of the woman was propagated, which—with repeated modifications—was to remain valid until the end of the GDR (see Bast/Ostner, 1992). The "Woman's Question" as a social problem was held to be resolvable only with the abolition of private property. Gender equality was to be reached only when the woman could be freed from enslavement in the family and her economic dependence on the man, and integrated as an independent economic party into societal production.

Therefore first of all establishing the formal equality of women in the work-place had priority. The family was—in contrast to the situation in the Western occupation zones—for the moment no topic for politics: "The extensive legal-political abstinence with regard to the family meant however, that the status quo of women's responsibility for the family was not touched; their equality was to be reached by way of occupational participation, without consideration for their familial duties." (Schäfgen, 2000, p. 93) From the beginning of the 1960s the policy of women's integration into employment was extended with a qualifications-offensive, which was complimented by the first social policy measures aimed at reducing the double burden of occupation and family (such as the "house-keeping day" etc.).

Looking back, the first phases of women's policy in the Soviet zone and GDR, until around 1964, could be considered as "the most progressive in the sense of creating gender equality" (Ibid., p. 102). But the success of these policies remained modest. With the introduction of a new family codex (1965), and the VIIth SED Party Congress in 1967, the family itself became now the object of political
intervention. Both marriage partners became legally responsible for child-raising and housework. In reality little changed. Time-budget analyses from the GRD (gender-separate data are available only for the period 1974-85) show a constantly lower participation of men in family tasks: the men's share of the household work did rise in this period from 26.4% to 30.1%; in childcare and time devoted to children their part rose from 24.1% to 25.8%, but these results are probably statistical artifacts, since the work commitment of the men in absolute terms did not rise; only the women's share diminished slightly in these time-budget categories (see Manz/Winkler, 1988, p. 198). The family-policy transformation in GDR politics was accused of being "double-bottomed": for it was in reality, according to Ute Gerhard, not concerned primarily with gender equality also within the family, as much as with, above all, the exploitative functionalization of the family as institution and socializing mechanism of the socialist state (see Gerhard, 1994).

With the drastic birth-rate decline since the mid-1960s, and after the VIIIth SED Party Congress (1972), family policy, and the then newly introduced concept of social policy, were subject to population policy objectives having the urgent priority of influencing the reproductive function of the family. The core of the package of measures (constantly broadened up until the final days of the GDR) was firstly the progressive increase in financial transfers linked to family establishment and the birth of children, and secondly the extension of pregnancy and childbirth leaves, and flanking that, the improvement of the service and care system which should enable women after giving birth to return to the occupational system. The overriding objective of GDR social policy was securing full-time female employment in order to respond—considering the chronic shortage of labor—to the threat of increasing female part-time work. From 1976 a "baby care year" was introduced for those with a second child, and other benefits were improved, to bring about an increase in birth-rates. Fathers at first could take neither the baby-care year (this only from 1986) nor the house-keeping day: "The special privileges of employed women (shorter work periods, longer occupational interruptions) meant a new re-assignment of women’s duties to mothers." (Schäfgen, 2000, p. 109) Women came to be risk factors for management and consequently, discriminated in their careers. This contradiction between postulated gender equality and actual
discrimination was answered by women (also) in the GDR with reduced reproduction. From the beginning of the 1980s the model of the 3-child family was propagated with new intensity, from 1986 the baby-care year could already be taken with the first child, and after the birth of the third child this was extended to 18 months.

The GDR birth-rate fell in the 1980s despite these measures from 1.94 (1980) to 1.57 (1989) (Wendt, 1997, p. 119), approaching the consistently still lower rates of West Germany. Remarkable however is the fact that the number of childless women in the GDR also continuously fell, so that more women were giving birth to fewer children. Children and marriage in the GDR were part of normal existence; the family played a central role. Wendt speaks of the "standardized family" and "standardized Motherhood" in so far as other family models, besides the double-earner marriage, were discriminated against socially and legally. Family forms besides the nuclear one, such as co-habitation or single parenting, increased however also in the GDR, at least in the 1980s (see Wendt, 1997, pp. 148f.).

In sum, the GDR policy of combining family and occupation has been aptly described by Hildegard Nickel as "combination-arrangement". Double employment of the marriage partners was combined with state childcare; but the concept of full labor-market integration of women was bound to the woman's primary responsibility for the household and childcare. In the new (i.e. eastern) GFR Länder women are today still trying to live after this model (see Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 128; Konietzka/Kreyenfeld, 20026).

2.3 The Adenauer era -- from complementarity to partnership

The policies of the German Federal Republic, differently from the case in East Germany, approved openly the bourgeois family model of the housewife marriage, which since the beginning of the 20th century had been culturally at the core of the gender arrangement.

6 The differences between the Eastern and the Western Länder seem, however, bigger than at the time of German unification (1989). Konietzka and Kreyenfeld explore that the proportions
Now, in the 1950s, it was actually practiced on a wide scale, in West Germany as in the US. Not being employed was seen generally as an indicator of a housewife's position of prosperity and privilege (see Kolinsky, 1989, p. 24). Eva Kolinsky points to the fact that it was in no way only an alliance of men that sent women back to the household. In the immediate Postwar it was essentially women who had organized physical survival, developing thereby practical competence often equal or superior to that of returning men, psychologically damaged from the repeated discouragements of war. These women wanted, writes Kolinsky, to find in a time of chaos and destruction an alternative world of "normality", the "dream of normality, stability and personal status in the family world" (Ibid., p. 37). Besides, it was above all working-class women who had been employed in the war economy; for middle-class women the occupational system offered, neither during nor after the war, qualified employment. "Women lost in this way a great historical chance", wrote Birgit Pfau-Effinger (Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 119), because never had the number of women in the population been so high: they made up 70% of the potential electorate. But women in West Germany were neither represented in leading political positions, nor had political parties there any particular intentions of bringing about gender-equality: "Exclusion strategies effected by male actors in the employment system, and the cultural orientation of a greater part of women apparently contributed to preventing any possible change in the gender-arrangement." (Ibid.)

Later the family policies of Adenauer's Germany were concentrated on assuring the housewife marriage model (by the so-called Ehegattensplitting in the income tax system, child allowances, and protection rights for mothers, among other schemes), which however also included "minimal" part-time work, so that women, though with an awareness of themselves as housewives enjoying the material protection of the male breadwinner, could obtain a low supplemental income of their own. Empirical studies like those carried out by Elisabeth Pfeil and Helge Pross in the sixties and early seventies showed consistently a family-centered life plan among young women, and among housewives, an ambivalent attitude to-

of non-marital births in 1989 in east and west were 34% and 10% respectively and increased in 1999 to 50% in the east and 18% in the west.
wards paid work. For with the democratization and liberalization of West-German society above all after 1968, and the appearance of a new women’s movement, many women saw the possibility of their emancipation only in paid employment. But they were afraid of not being able to compete with men in that "outside world".

This has clearly changed as a consequence of the great expansion in educational opportunities since the beginning of the 1970s. For their daughters, the 80s- and-90s-generation, employment history forms the core of their projected biographies. Birgit Pfau-Effinger explains this change in orientation of West German women vis-a-vis employment above all by the fact that on the cultural level there was a deepening of the contradiction between generally more civil liberty on the one hand, and traditional patterns of inequality in marriage on the other. Also, the values of foresight, sacrifice and selflessness connected with the housewife role, lost more and more significance in times of individualization and hedonism. The decisive turning-point came in the seventies, as those women who devoted themselves fully to their family were now--in a time when individuals were classified according to their position in the occupational hierarchy--disqualified as "non-working" (see Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 121). Further reasons for the value transformation for women in the relation family/work are to be found in the fragility of lifelong marriage agreements, in higher levels of prosperity and consumption standards and, because of educational expansion, in the new access of women to high-qualification occupations. Finally, of considerable importance was also the growth of the service sector in recent decades, by which employment opportunities for women above all have increased.

Official family policy in the GFR--above all during the Social-Liberal coalition years (1969-1982)--reacted ambivalently to the new social and cultural change. On the one hand for example marriage laws were reformed with the objective of achieving partner equality, in the same manner that the Social Democrats (SPD) generally considered social reality to be formable by legislation.

On the other hand women’s employment was not only promoted (by occupational training, student allowances, etc.), but also problematized. The federal government declared in its second Report on the Family (1974) considerable "socializa-
tion disturbances" in the family, the causes of which were also claimed to have been found in the "regrettable increase in employment among married women".

The SPD discussed (1979) the introduction of a financial allowance for child-raising, which was very controversial in the Women's Movement: while some saw in a "wage for housework" a codification of patriarchal dependency, others saw in the idea an overdue recognition of the societally essential work of mothers and housewives (see Schäfgen, 2000, pp. 80f.).

With the Christian-Liberal coalition from 1982 followed a rhetorical change of course which, unlike in the former coalition, aimed less at promoting the division of family work among marriage-partners, as much as at emphasizing family values; and this new course was no longer directed at the objective of equal rights for partners (also to employment), but--beneath the slogan of a "new partnership between Woman and Man" at the 33rd CDU National Party Congress (1985)--only at the equal valuation of housework and work outside the home. In 1986 followed federal legislation (at about the same time as similar regulations in the GDR) on child-raising leaves and allowances, whereby the initial payments were so low (and also not statistically adjusted to the rise of wages and living costs) that they were claimed almost only by women. It is worth noting as an historical aspect, that these reforms, as well as the introduction ten years later of the legal right to kindergarten care as part of a reform of youth-assistance laws, can also (some say: above all) be interpreted as (family-)political compensation for simultaneous changes in the abortion law (§ 218 StGB).

In spite of the plausible feminist criticism of--relatively conservative in European terms--GFR policies on the relation family/occupation, those policies do not seem to have been actually so far amiss of people's needs, at least in the longer term. Characteristic for West-German women was namely--and still in the 1990s--a dual-career arrangement based on reduced working-hours: in an opinion poll by Allensbach in 1996, 46% of women preferred being mothers and part-time employed, and 33% wanted to be exclusively housewife and mother; the latter were older-generation women, so that a decline in preference for that model is probable in the future. Only 8% of West-German women wanted to be full-time employed
mothers, and only 9% stated that they would like to become or continue to be childless career-women (see Pfau-Effinger, 2000, p. 126).

These attitudes are in no way unrealistic, for West-German men--similar to their East-German colleagues--have only to a very limited extent increased their attention to children and especially childcare. In the public debate, esp. among the male leaders of all parties—in Germany, and if we may extend this observation, all around the world—the problem of compatibility of family and occupation is above all seen as problem for mothers, not for men.

It is certain that their partners' participation in housework and childcare is important to many women, and that this is often a source of conflict in households. At the same time however, the male norm of full-time work, the role of the male "breadwinner" in the provider marriage, and the model of "one-and-a-half occupations" in the phase of active parenthood, are apparently also practically unquestioned by women of the youngest generation. "One could", writes Pfau-Effinger, "tendentiously call the basic idea 'gender equality in the difference' within the male-provider marriage: Many women want to be able to pursue female-specific objectives in their lifetimes, e.g. a family phase, with elements of private motherhood, without being societally disadvantaged vis-à-vis men for that reason." (Ibid., p. 128; see also Ostner/Opielka, 1987, who refer in this connection to "having part"--Ger. Teilhabe--as the guiding idea, a kind of synthesis of the historical "difference" between the genders, and the Marxist-feminist postulate of "equality").

2.4 1989ff. -- Joining the modern Europe

With German re-unification collided at first the gender-political differences between East and West. Even now (2002) the orientations of women in the "old" and "new" GFR Länder differ with regard to full-time employment, although they do show a certain convergence in the direction of Western models, after the principle of "equality within the difference". As we saw, this convergence can be based on a situation of necessity which also in the GDR played a great role--even if this was ideologically resented.
One could describe the situation, simplified, as follows: in the main, women want children, and so do men. Since children cause work, the question arises, who is going to do it. In the western Länder much more than half of women do not see any solution in a professionalization and institutionalization of childcare for the first three years of life; in the East this percentage is notably lower. But even with a high level of childcare professionalization, a lot of work, and the necessity of being present and ready, remains, especially with small children. Who is to make this investment of time, and when? Men don't want to change very much their occupational behavior, and women also support this. Thus, work in the family remains for the women to do. Certainly, this is a simplified description, but it is supported by the data: "In the vast majority of families the responsibility for the housework, by common consent, seems to lie with the women, while the participation of men in the housework is interpreted as a helping role." (Kaufmann, 1995, p. 127)

This is actually not only the case in re-unified Germany, but also in other countries, and even in the often-qualified as "more modern" Scandinavia. Men there consider their participation in the household as "voluntary help", their "demonstration of love", whereby this is "highly dependent on the emotional stability of the partnership relation" (Ibid.). Furthermore, men show more verbal commitment to housework and child-raising than by their behavior. This indicates a certain inconsistency between consciousness and deed, but also surely some important objective obstacles. Namely, the longer the female partner has held the main paid position in the family--though the partners may be similarly qualified--the more the husband is apt to be motivated to do housework. “Active fathership”, however, is dependent on additional motivations (see Fthenakis et al., 2002, pp. 134ff.).

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<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Wife</th>
<th>Husband</th>
<th>Family policy</th>
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<th>Historical dominance in Germany</th>
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<td>Natalism</td>
<td>Mother (&quot;racially pure&quot;)</td>
<td>Patriarchy</td>
<td>Demographic orientation, selectivity</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Nazi period (1933-1945)</td>
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This makes the initial family-policy situation in the "new" Germany therefore so interesting. After the historical periods of the Nazis' racist motherhood ideology, the postwar split into an "equality ideology" in the East, and a "difference ideology" in the West, the united Germany now--at latest with the 21st century--joins the modern, "average" Europe (see Fig. 1). That is true at least for the cultural leitmotifs, but not necessarily for what concerns the family-policy instruments. For Germany in this regard is one of the rather unprogressive European countries; the attitude of its state (here with reference to the 5th Report on the Family of the German federal government) and society towards the family can be described, in the words of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, as one of "structural disregard for the family" (Kaufmann, 1995, pp. 169-171).

The abbreviations after the models (L1 to L4) indicate a socio-theoretical advancement in logical complexity comparable to the increase of complexity in Talcott Parsons' AGIL-scheme (for a more detailed discussion of the sociological theory behind this, see Opielka, 1996, 2003).
3 The political parties between the issues of women's employment and childcare allowances

So what can be done about the situation? Family policy, after a long time of leading a marginal existence, seems to have revitalized. This is the case not only in Germany. In other (western) countries too the family has become a political problem (see Gauthier, 1996; Ringen, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 2002). In the US for example it has been recognized that the situation of American children, and with them the future of the whole society, is endangered by the newer phases of the globalization process (see Kamerman, 1998), and that the United States in the past has spent much too little on childcare. Jane Waldvogel recapitulates a comparison of American and various European family policies by stating that the US should introduce a paid general child-raising leave of at least 10 months; more intensively support parents in financing childcare; and improve the quality of childcare (Waldvogel, 2001, p. 99). In Germany one would smile at such proposals as these. But if from Germany one takes a look at our European neighbors, the smile of superiority quickly fades. Other countries, above all Scandinavia and France, but also the Benelux states, do significantly more for young families in all or some areas (see BMFSFJ, 1998). Therefore it is not strange that the German political parties--certainly encouraged by a number of far-reaching decisions by the German Constitutional Court--have meanwhile launched a kind of contest for the best family policy.

The historical look back on the total German experience in the matter of family shows that in spite of wide acceptance of the middle-class family model since the beginning of the 20th century, the "gender system of work was considered generally extremely precarious and unstable" (Hausen, 2000, p. 350), the topic of women's employment in continually new variations appeared on the political agenda, and again and again the attempt was made to orientate young women to the "natural" occupation of mother. The compatibility of family and occupation remained, wrote Karin Hausen, a "woman's dilemma": "Since the 1980s this dilemma ascribed to women has appeared in newer packaging, as, in the face of the increasing occupational orientation of women, programs supporting the family
were not imposed as family or men's--but rather women's--promotion programs." (Ibid.; see also Ostner/Lewis, 1998)

This appears to be changing since the beginning of the 21st century. In wide-ranging program papers the two large German parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU), have made an effort to address the issue of the family. It is worthwhile to examine their positions more closely, because they define the actual dilemmas and in part come up with basically differing answers.

3.1 SPD: Compatibility through employment integration

Much more intensive and professional has been the work on family policy by the two larger parties. Of them, the SPD had the greater remedial need in this area. In the past, no particular expertise was ascribed to this party in the area of family policy. For decades it discussed the topic of family only under the heading of women's issues. It was thanks to the initiative of SPD alternate Chairholder Renate Schmidt, Federal Secretary of State for Family Affairs since 2002, that this situation changed. She initiated a party commission which, immediately after the party's accession in 1998 and under the general watchwords "Future of the Family and Social Cohesion" and "Forum on the Family" was to formulate basic questions on a revaluation of the family, also by obtaining the opinions of party-bound academic specialists and representatives of organizations (see SPD-Projektgruppe, 2000). In a wide-ranging document presented at the SPD Party Congress in Nuremberg in Nov., 2001 a new orientation for family policy was proposed. In it, the departure from all feminist anti-family overtones is remarkable; instead, there is the realistic formulation: "Family, in the classical form the nuclear family, i.e. an adult couple with biological children, has revealed itself (...) more stable than suspected (...) divorce and separation occur largely in childless couples (..)" etc. (SPD-Parteivorstand, 2001, p. 4) It is apparent that the authors have recognized, in the "middle" of society, which the SPD is trying to win over, also the Family. At the same time they complain of an "increasing division of society (...) into family and non-family sectors". That the desire for children and its realization
often do not coincide, the authors identify as the cause the unsolved incompatibility of family and occupation.

How shall this problem be tackled? Above all two packages of measures are suggested: for one, an "all-day supervision infrastructure for children of all age groups" (Ibid., p. 13), and secondly, the further development of a recompensation scheme for work in the family, in the direction of a change in the child-raising allowance, such that "for one year it can function as salary replacement" (Ibid., p. 15). In this regard the hope is that fathers will become engaged more intensively in the care of small children, since fathers "today, because they earn more than mothers, and want to provide for their families' economic security, largely forego this opportunity" (Ibid., p. 16). Now that is certainly a somewhat exaggerated interpretation of scientific findings on the reticence of fathers to claim childcare leaves (or the newer term: "parenting time"). For, even with equal incomes, men and women tend to stick with the traditional gender arrangement, which speaks for deeply anchored cultural norms (see Vaskovics/Rost, 1999).

How is the proposal package of the SPD to be assessed in light of German family policy generally? First, it is noticeable that both instruments--all-day child supervision and parenting allowance as salary replacement--have been taken from the Scandinavian as well as the GDR family-policy schemes. Their main idea is gender "equality". But because men are not assuming female modes of life but very slowly, the solution to the problem is in the societalization of family tasks, while assuring the continuity of the occupational progress of women (even though modeled after that of men). In contrast to the GDR the SPD (meanwhile) has approved part-time work solutions and flexible work hours, thus joining ranks with Scandinavian countries already experienced in such family policies since the 1990s. This experience shows that male behavior patterns hardly change, or at best extremely slowly. Thus the "compatibility of family and occupation" in the SPD party program will also remain, for the moment anyway, a project for mothers, which nevertheless should expect significantly more societal support.
This rather critical assessment of the occupationally oriented family concept of the SPD may be relativized however, upon looking from a wider, European perspective. Birgit Pfau-Effinger has observed, in the welfare states whose policies were based on the housewife model of the male breadwinner marriage--among which she includes post-war Germany--a transformation of the "gender arrangement" (see Pfau-Effinger, 2001). Already during the Christian/Liberal coalition in the 1990s, as a reaction to cultural change, steps were undertaken more decisively in the direction of an individualization of claims to family-policy benefits, and with that, a greater independence of mothers from male providers (child-raising leaves included in public pension insurance, etc.). The "Red/Green" coalition has, since 1998, in particular with the Parent-Leave Law, in application from the beginning of 2001, undertaken further steps towards a "cultural modernization of the male breadwinner model", such that: parenting leaves and child-raising allowance claims can be combined with part-time work of up to 30 hours; one year of the parenting leave can be delayed until the end of the child's eighth year; fathers and mothers can take parenting leave simultaneously; but above all, a parent is conceded the legal right to switch to part-time work, at least in firms with more than 15 employees. Parenthood is taken thus a step further out of the exclusively private sphere and into the context of societal responsibility.

This SPD program just mentioned aims beyond the long-overdue modernization measures, towards an extension of women's freedom of choice--but of course this means above all the choice of employment and children. Taking up the terminology of Pfau-Effinger, the program can be defined as the "double breadwinner model with state childcare" (Pfau-Effinger, 2001), for decades the dominant family and gender-policy model in Scandinavia and France. The SPD demand for the abolition of the German tax splitting model for spouses and an extension of all-day supervision facilities for children fits in along this path of development. The increase of the child-allowance to a level covering minimum needs has on the other hand its political source in the wish to redistribute wealth in order to bring about social justice. Actually the SPD is attempting with this to achieve a kind of guaranteed basic income for children, which does not conflict with the party's central emphasis on employment, as would a guaranteed income for persons of working age. The SPD remains thus true to its historical roots: A citizen becomes a citizen
by gainful employment, and that applies also to women. The obvious dilemma of women that employment and family tasks become a double burden, making the expectation of a full occupational career realistic only by renouncing on reproduction, the SPD tries to resolve by broadening public child supervision and fatherhood campaigns, in which fathers are encouraged to do voluntarily more work in the family.

3.2 CDU: Compatibility through family allowance

With the loss of its long-held governing position in 1998 was created also in the CDU some "mental breathing space" in which it could examine its ideological assumptions anew for their basis in reality. In family policy this means above all recognizing the plurality of forms of family life, but also accepting this as a practically unalterable political fact. While the SPD program begins with the presumption of the "normality" of the nuclear family, the point of systemic revision for the CDU lies in the liberal realization of "non-normality": "Therefore we recognize the family anywhere, where parents have responsibility for children, and children for parents." (CDU Federal Board, 2001, p. 39) The CDU also sees the compatibility of family and occupation as a "key question" in assessing the child-friendliness of a society. Their strategy for solving this question differs however significantly from that of the SPD.

In order to understand the difference, it is worth looking at the diagnosis: "The desired family-life model today is, for the majority, the simultaneous occupational activity of both partners. There are however still many women who wish to devote themselves exclusively to the family and child-raising. This must also in the future remain possible; the CDU stands for the principle of freedom of choice." (Ibid., p. 39) Now, the SPD would not formulate this so, at least not if it is a matter of benefit claims which result from said freedom of choice.

While the SPD demands an "all-day infrastructure" for the supervision of children, the analog CDU proposal of "need-based construction of all-day schools" (CDU Bundestag parliamentary group, 2001, p. 7) sounds more restrained, though in
essence, similar. The difference is to be found in the monetary transfer systems for families (*Familienlastenausgleich*). While the SPD—with the argument of women's integration into employment and encouraging less occupational work by fathers—is betting on a combination of employment and transfer systems, the CDU wants to replace the existing "child allowance" and "child-raising allowance" with a "family allowance" which will be tax- and social contribution-free and—remarkably—unaffected by the extent of other employment and/or level of income. The amount quoted for this allowance is a sum of ca. 613 Euro per month for each child under three years, ca. 307 Euro for each child between three and seventeen, and ca. 154 Euro for older children while still attending school (ibid., pp. 10ff.; CDU Federal Board, 2001, pp. 41-43). At the same time, as a broadening of the existing system, a "time account" for "family time" of three years within the first eight years of a child's life has been suggested, and it can be extended to 3½ years as an incentive for fathers, if both partners share the family time.

The costs of such a measure are naturally considerable: the CDU parliamentary group has calculated that a good 25 billion Euro extra will have to be spent yearly. The group expects, armed with an expert opinion from the *ifo Institut* (proceeding on the basis of a distinctly lower family-allowance level; see Werding, 2001), only relatively low-level refinancing to be necessary due to employment and growth effects, so that this measure represents in fact a far-reaching re-organization project, and an investment in Families.

How is the proposal of a "family allowance" (*Familiengeld*) to be assessed, above all in its effect on the compatibility between family and occupational activity? A look back at the discussion and controversy surrounding the proposal made in "Child-raising salary 2000" (*Erziehungsgehalt 2000*; Leipert/Opielka, 1999) might help (see Tünnemann, 2000). That concept differed in a few variables of level and structure from the new CDU model (the amount suggested for the child-raising salary was 2000 DM, i.e. ca. 1000 Euro per month; for each additional child should be paid only modest supplements; the salary should be social contribution-free but not tax-free, i.e. taxed like any other income). But both concepts have in common the absence of any relation to the occupational activity (amount of income) of the claimant, and to any supplemental income of the claimants. While in
the CDU proposal the latter is still a little unclear [the IFO opinion paper already mentioned actually implies a kind of taxability, because it is not clear that the existing tax-free, minimum living-cost income allowed by law is going to continue in addition to the family allowance (see Werding, 2001, p. 5)], one can see one fact above all expressed in the irrelevance of the occupational activity to the family allowance: it is meant to honor the work accomplished in family and child-raising.

In terms of social-policy theory, the actual innovations are contained in the side-remarks, for example in an accompanying strategy paper of the CDU parliamentary group. In it the family allowance is discussed in the context of an employment-promoting policy, whereby an interesting logic is suggested which permits the family allowance to be understood as something other than a usual 'financial transfer': "The difference between the minimum income guaranteed by social assistance and minimum wages (Lohnabstand) must be increased. Whoever works must on principle earn more after taxes than someone who doesn't, but gets transfer benefits. By means of the family allowance too, those differences will be upheld." (CDU Parliamentary Group, 2001, p. 16) Perhaps the authors of the paper did not realize entirely how far-reaching their considerations would be, but they seem to have conceived of the family allowance as a sort of primary income just like wages and salaries. If we suspend the convention of looking at the total national economic balance-sheet, we can see here a new concept of the politically directed revaluation of societal work: the family allowance (as also the "child-raising salary" already mentioned) shouldn't be considered recompensation for lost wages, on the principle of contribution-equivalent social insurance, nor a welfare benefit linked to need, after the principle of social assistance. In as far as the CDU proposal intends to integrate into the family allowance also (the present) "child allowance", the social-policy logic of the latter--i.e. the principle of care ("Versorgung") on the basis of special status (familiar from the special legal status of civil servants or war victims)--would accrue to it. One could go so far as to see, in the idea of the family allowance, something like the nucleus of a "guaranteed basic income" for child-raising persons and, later, for children and youth (see Opielka, 2000).
But whether this family allowance helps or hinders the compatibility of family and occupation, is not easy to judge. At first glance one must suppose that it would be helped, for the family allowance would be received as a supplement to occupational income, meaning that each extra Euro earned would come more or less without deduction (depending on the rate of taxation) into the family household. Advocates (of both sexes) of the rather "standardized", i.e. above all full-time occupational biography, especially of mothers, will of course remark critically, that the family allowance will be, instead, a motivation for part-time work or even some irregular employment, since at least in the first three years of a child's life, and in complete families with two partners some low-level employment can also be sufficient to survival, when material wishes are relatively modest. In contrast to the SPD proposal--i.e. child-raising allowance as wage-replacement--the family allowance (res. a child-raising salary) would favor the mixing of various income types. There is plenty of indication that the trend is towards income-mixing anyway. Georg Vobruba has argued convincingly that any future labor policy which does not consider the mixing of income sources will be a failure, since full-time employment in the sense of the standardized, "normal" job (full-time, lifelong, covering the cost of living) is neither probable nor desirable (see Vobruba 2000).

4 The family as social capital

Social policy is, more than most other policy areas, the art of the compromise. The comparison of the family-policy programs of both popular parties reveals, in great part, similar and (while disregarding social-cultural-related references) even identical ideas. Even the essence of the differences allows compromise to appear conceivable, also since the SPD–paper from 2001 already examined is still to be incorporated into a new Party Program. The idea of structuring the child-raising allowance as a wage replacement was in that document in addition probably kept vague, and, upon close consideration, formulated as a issue to be assessed by a governmental commission which was yet to be formed (and that permits a suspicion that the SPD party federal board and the national party congress, which was to approve that document, supposed a certain reform-delaying tactic on the part of the responsible Madame minister, who was also a party colleague). One can wish
the SPD that, in light of the perspectives discussed in this paper, that assessment could be re-examined.

In essence it is a matter of questions about the Constitution of our society which can in the end only be answered by all the relevant societal groups--similar to the decision in favor of a democratic system or a market economy.

Our introductory considerations concerned the relation of the value of work in various societal spheres; here, of the work in the family vis-à-vis work in the market-centered occupational system. While for decades a positive revaluation of family work was ultimately only politically deflected, above all by means of maintenance arrangements between the spouses, and negotiated as a women's problem, now a basic reassessment of family work seems at least as a possibility to be on the horizon (see Netzler/Opielka, 1998; Leipert, 2001; Krebs, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2002). This reassessment is due, among other things, also to the sociologically informed attention of society, and to those common bonds, values, norms and institutions which can be grasped under the name of "Social Capital" (see Putnam, 2000), and are discussed in the 5th Family Report of the German Federal Government as "Human Capital" or "Human Potential".

The family plays, in the formation of social or human capital, an absolutely central role, which meanwhile gains the necessary scientific and public attention with help from representative time-budgeting studies and the so-called Satellite Account Household Production ("Satellitenrechnung Haushaltsproduktion") of the Federal Statistics Office: "It is realistic to assume that the total worth of housework not calculated in social product studies makes up more than half of the social product." Thus summarizes Kaufmann the state of research (Kaufmann, 1995, p. 75).

The recognition of the value of work done in the family is today empirically well founded. Now politics is being asked to formulate suitable institutional structures which will make this recognition visible--just as every societal institution is the carrier of social meaning. Critics of these considerations may suspect a kind of family-based socialism. And that suspicion is not so far off the mark, for all social pol-
icy can be interpreted, as the social-democratic social policy teacher Eduard Heimann in the 1920s formulated, as "Socialism within Capitalism".

A policy which aims at a real compatibility of family and occupational life while respecting the legal equality of man and woman, will need to transpose more than ever before three transaction types out of the family, or respectively, private economic sphere, and into the state or public sphere (and by that giving them the character of a public good): the supervision of small children and others needy of care, by means of occupationalization or professionalization; the financial assurance of living costs coverage by state-guaranteed transfers of money for children and carers; and the surveillance of the compatibility of family and occupational duties by labor policy and labor laws. One can see that this process is already long underway. It has proved itself in the long run.

That the present institutions of the gender arrangement and the compatibility of family and job are ineffective, is being fortunately increasingly realized (see Gottschall/Pfau-Effinger, 2002). At risk are in fact the foundations of modern society and its population, its people, as demographs have been observing already for years with alarm. The current acceleration of European integration and globalization of goods, labor and social markets is destroying, precisely, social capital: "The economic virtues of ability to conform, flexibility and mobility, on which our economic prosperity is based, are diametrically opposed to the virtues important to the founding of families and to the objectives of planning, security and foresight in the personal biography, because they make difficult long-term bonds to people, and often completely exclude the usually life-long responsibility for one's life partner and children." In this way the demograph Herwig Birg explains the decline in births, the societal effects of which he rightly judges to be dramatic (see Birg, 2001): social security contributions will rise, and health and care costs will expand, which will necessarily increase wage costs per product and thus diminish the competitiveness of the national economy: "The horror scenario of the consequences of climate change are harmless in comparison to the threat of the cultural and social desertification of our society, if perhaps the extensive use of genetic analysis and diagnosis of disease risk is justified by the argument of the drastic reduction of costs to the health-care system", Birg believes.
The compatibility of family and occupation shows itself therefore in socio-political perspective to be an issue which cannot be addressed by means of past solutions. It requires a fundamental broadening of the social policy program, a transformation of the employment-centered welfare state, and a recognition of work in the family as societal work.

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